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**MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD
AN ELUSIVE OBJECTIVE--
A TOTAL ARMY**

BY

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Progress toward force integration is threatened by a communication breakdown between the Army components, between the Army and the Congress, and between the Army and the American public. When discussing itself as a Total Army, the dialogue is clouded by misunderstanding, prejudice, self-interest and unrealistic expectations. The results are animosity between the components, lost credibility for the Army, and cutthroat competition between components for dwindling resources.

Communication difficulties in the Army occur because Active and Reserve Component officers perceive things differently based on their membership in different cultural units. Active Army attitudes toward the Reserve and National Guard, including arrogance and intolerance, aggravate the problem.

The misunderstanding and the harmful attitudes are integral to the Active Army culture. They provide a means by which Active officers view their world and communicate about it to others, but they do not promote the stated Total Army policy.

The "Army" would be served better by examining its cultural assumptions, abandoning unwarranted prejudices and stereotypes, and beginning a new era of understanding and mutual support. This survey can provide the basis for the critical first steps toward improved Army communication and a true Total Army team.

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MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD AN ELUSIVE
OBJECTIVE--A TOTAL ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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In the early 1970's, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams outlined his vision of a Total Army consisting of three interwoven components--Active, Reserve and National Guard. Every succeeding Chief of Staff shared that vision. However, a survey of Army officers in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1993 indicates the Total Army is not yet a reality despite rhetoric to the contrary.

Progress toward force integration is threatened by a communication breakdown between the Army components, between the Army and the Congress, and between the Army and the American public. When discussing itself as a Total Army, the dialogue is clouded by misunderstanding, prejudice, self-interest and unrealistic expectations. The results are animosity between the components, lost credibility for the Army, and cutthroat competition between components for dwindling resources.

Communication difficulties in the Army occur because Active and Reserve Component officers perceive things differently based on their membership in different cultural units. Active Army attitudes toward the Reserve and National Guard, including arrogance and intolerance, aggravate the problem.

The misunderstanding and the harmful attitudes are integral to the Active Army culture. They shape the way by which Active officers view their world and communicate about it to others. They do not promote the stated Total Army policy.

The "Army" would be served better by examining its cultural assumptions, abandoning unwarranted prejudices and stereotypes, and beginning a new era of understanding and mutual support. This survey can provide the basis for the critical first steps toward improved Army communication and a true Total Army team.

INTRODUCTION

"America's Army. . . trained and ready to fight. . . serving the nation at home and abroad. . . a strategic force capable of decisive victory. A total force strengthened by fully integrating our active and reserve components. . ."¹

This vision of the Army Chief of Staff is similar to the vision outlined by General Creighton Abrams in the early 1970's. However, a survey of the Army officers in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1993 indicates the Total Force/Total Army is not yet a reality. How else can one explain such caustic comment as the one below from a soon-to-be-promoted Active component (AC) lieutenant colonel:

"The problem with the Reserve components is they and us (sic) do not/cannot line up behind one commander. . . Our Total Army is a pipedream."²

or this from a Reserve component (RC) lieutenant colonel and former battalion commander:

"Active duty soldiers will never think that the RC can do as good a job as the AC. How could they justify a 535,000 force if they thought the RC was viable?"³

The next generation of Army leaders, both active and reserve, perceives that we do not have a Total Army in fact, although rhetoric to the contrary abounds. It is time to move forward but, to do that ". . . we must face the issues openly and honestly."⁴ (emphasis added). Then after identifying the problem areas, corrective action can be implemented.

BACKGROUND

The appropriate AC/RC force mix has been a point of contention within the Army since our early colonial period. Military leaders

from the Revolutionary War to the present all struggled with designing an Army best capable of supporting the national security strategy.

Now, according to the Department of Defense (DoD), ". . .we have moved to a Total Force Policy that integrates active and reserve forces into a homogenous whole. . ."⁵ According to DoD:

"It is DoD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployment or sea duty, training requirements, and to support the rotation base. Above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a cost effective basis."⁶

Department of Defense publications often cite two basic tenets of the Total Force Policy: "(1) reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active forces; and (2) integrated use of all available personnel--active, reserve, civilian, and allied."⁷ There is also considerable support for a third tenet not yet acknowledged by DoD as official policy--that the Army ". . . should be structured to make active and reserve units so interdependent that a President could not send military forces to combat without activating the reserves."⁸ The most ardent supporters for this third force mix principle are members of Congress and certain military service organizations.⁹ The intent of those who advocate such inextricable linkage between the components seems twofold: (1) to provide a check on the President's ability to commit forces without adequate consideration for the effects of public opinion; and (2) to mobilize the "will of

the people" through mobilization of their hometown citizen soldiers. "Some people argue that it is not just any reserve forces but reserve combat forces that need to go early in any deployment to ensure the support of the American public" (emphasis added).¹⁰

Regardless of the public pronouncements in support of it, Army implementation of the Total Force Policy has been imperfect at best. Further progress is threatened by acrimonious debate and competition for resources among the three components--the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (USAR). The stakes have been raised by ongoing efforts of the Administration and Congress for force reductions and increased military efficiency. The animosity was heightened by the perceived misutilization by the AC of some RC forces during the Gulf War, most notably three ARNG roundout brigades, and failure to activate the USAR Theater Army logistical command and control headquarters.

According to the former Chief, Plans Division, U.S. Central Command, certain mobilization actions during the Gulf War were based on:

"apparent distrust of the [RC] leadership and command and control organizations. . . . [T]he Army further demonstrated a lack of confidence in the individuals that form a powerful segment of the Total Army."¹¹

Active Army decisions not to utilize fully the capabilities of its RC during the Gulf War had adverse effects for the Total Army. First, instead of mobilizing the designated, wartime logistics headquarters (a USAR unit) for Central Command, an ad hoc logistics structure was developed which "stretched . . . personnel to the

limits of their capabilities" over a relatively short period of 42 days.¹² If the campaign had lasted longer, combat effectiveness could have been degraded. Secondly, ". . . the rifts created by fallout from [AC] decisions threaten to color many other . . . issues of all [RC] units, their leadership, and the development of the future force structure of the Total Army."¹³

All three components have interests (especially force structure) at risk in the current debate, approaching it as a kind of zero sum game of "I win, you lose!"¹⁴ This is self-defeating for all. As put by one Army War College student: "We should not waste our most valuable resource--our people--by trying to guard our turf. Yet, turf guarding is exactly what it has come down to (sic)".

"In a post-Cold War world of shrinking defense resources, we need a new model that stresses complementarity of the active and reserve components in building a structure that is larger and more robust in its parts because it draws on the best that each component has to offer."¹⁵ As envisioned by Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, this model would be a Total Force--a tightly knit team of active soldiers, Army Reservists, National Guardsmen and Army civilians.

In a well-balanced Total Army, each of the three components would have legitimate and different roles. ". . . [W]e need to reinforce these complementary strengths and not try to make each in the mold of the other" (emphasis added).¹⁶

- "The role of the Active force should be to provide the majority of the combat ready [maneuver] forces, set

doctrine and standards, develop and conduct training for all components and provide the capability for rapid response and mobilization expansion."¹⁷

- "The ARNG. . . units with dual State/Federal status benefit the Army and the nation in several ways. They provide a base of military personnel and organization for mobilization expansion; they provide a positive link to the local communities in which they live; and they are available to local authorities for disaster response."¹⁸

- The USAR contributes to the Total Army another set of unique core competencies that enable it to support the Army in the Field and the Army as an Institution. These competencies include:

- Combat support/Combat service support (CS/CSS)
- CS/CSS command and control at Echelons Above Division and Corps
- Individuals in the Selected and Ready Reserve with special skills essential for contingency operations
- Federal status immediately available.¹⁹

Unless all Army components are willing to lay down the sword and approach the problem with "innovative thinking and a willingness . . . to put aside old prejudices and long held prerogatives"²⁰ we cannot achieve the CSA vision of a Total Force. Instead, we may be forced to accept sub-optimal solutions imposed by others with more immediate interests in peacetime operational efficiency than longer term requirements for wartime operational effectiveness.

What are these "old prejudices and prerogatives" that dog our efforts to become more integrated and effective? How do we eliminate them? These are hard questions. Dealing with the issues they raise is not likely to be easy or pleasant, but it is time to begin.

The authors of the December 1992 RAND report, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final

Report to the Secretary of Defense noted that AC and ARNG leaders were visibly uncomfortable "with ideas that might lead to more integration and end the competition between them."²¹

In an unpublished 1991 paper prepared at the Army War College, an AC officer asserted that ". . . we have ignored the struggling between components, [and] have grown a generation of senior officers that are parochial to a fault and who communicate in destructive half-truths."²² This causes the AC to render lip service to Total Force Policy and initiatives, and causes the RC to make exaggerated claims of combat capability in order to save face. The result is lost credibility for all involved. The author, who has extensive experience working with the RC, concluded that honest communication between the components is hampered by AC "attitudinal obstacles" including:

- (1) "a superiority complex, AC to RC;
- (2) benign neglect;
- (3) intolerance; and
- (4) a general lack of confidence in the abilities of reservists, especially at unit level."²³

Another AC officer with experience in all three Army components states that ". . . the AC officer seems to possess an arrogance toward, and an ignorance of, the RC. . . [but] arrogance is not cornered by AC; RC leaders have it too."²⁴ Ignorance and arrogance do not promote communication and cooperation.

As long ago as 1975, Senator Sam Nunn sensed that all was not right with Total Force Policy implementation. Nunn commented:

"I personally felt that one of the big impediments in preventing the total force policy from being a reality rather than a rhetoric has been the subjective reluctance of many people on active duty to believe that the Reserve Forces are a credible force" (emphasis added).²⁵

If, indeed, the Army is communicating and operating in an atmosphere of ignorance, arrogance and prejudice, we need to know that and take steps to improve the situation. Otherwise, how can we work together to create a more effective and efficient, integrated Total Army--the goal established by our senior leaders? "If members cannot communicate with and understand each other. . . , group [internal integration] is impossible by definition."²⁶

The Army ". . . must penetrate the negative stereotypes that distort perceptions in order to see both sides clearly."²⁷ To accomplish that, a critical first step is to embark on a new era of open, honest communication.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

This study was undertaken to: (1) assess whether--or to what degree--Active Army officers understand the RC; and (2) define their attitudes and perceptions concerning the RC. The results can be the basis for beginning a new era of open, honest communication in the Army, between the Army and the Congress, and between the Army and the American public.

A survey questionnaire elicited data from 178 AC and 20 RC officers who are resident students in the U.S. Army War College, Class of 93. Of the 178 Active officers, 87 (49%) completed and returned the questionnaire. (Thirteen RC officers also responded,

but their responses were not used for this particular study.)

Appendix A displays descriptive characteristics of the Active Army respondents. Appendix B is the survey questionnaire annotated with response totals for all survey questions. (Percentages in the report are based on the total number of actual responses for each individual question (maximum of 87 responses), and that total may vary from question to question. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.)

The awareness level of the selected group of officers toward the RC is especially important. On average, they have over 21 years of active duty experience and 91% have commanded at battalion level. Many had prior assignments to Readiness Groups, as advisors to RC units, or had prior experience in observing RC units during exercises or operational deployments. Many of them were on promotion lists at the time of the survey or were selected for promotion by subsequent boards prior to the end of the USAWC academic year. For some, their next duty will be a command assignment to a unit with planning or training associations with RC units. For others, it will be staff duty where they will develop Total Army policies or programs.

Hopefully, those students who completed the questionnaire have already benefitted from the experience. By confronting the difficult AC/RC issues it surfaced, they voluntarily examined their own attitudes and beliefs. That may lead them to recognize and discard any unwarranted prejudices about the RC they may have held.

Responses to some questions provide a measure of the frequency of certain attitudes and opinions in the student body itself, for example:

"The Reserve Components have often tended to be 'social clubs' first and military organizations second with members having little expectation of actually being mobilized for OCONUS combat operations."

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
6 (7%)	23 (27%)	23 (27%)	31 (37%)	1 (1%)

Responses to other questions provide a measure of the impressions of the student officers concerning the frequency of certain attitudes and opinions in the greater, corporate, Army officer corps, for example:

"In general, today's senior Active Component Army officers possess adequate knowledge about the National Guard."

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1 (1%)	20 (30%)	15 (17%)	38 (44%)	6 (7%)

In aggregate, the responses provide valuable insight into answering five basic questions concerning knowledge of, and attitudes and opinions toward, the RC by AC officers:

- A. Do AC officers understand the RC?
- B. Do AC officers have a superior attitude toward the RC?
- C. Are AC officers confident in Reservists' individual, professional commitment, competence, and availability for mobilization?
- D. Are AC officers confident in RC units' wartime mission

capability and their availability for mobilization and deployment?

E. Do AC officers support or have confidence in current Army programs to enhance Total Army integration?

Verbatim officer comments are provided in addition to statistical summaries and comparisons. These are important to flesh out the quantitative survey results and provide valuable personal insights.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Question: Do AC officers understand the RC?

Findings: Many AC officers perceive that senior AC officers do not possess adequate knowledge about the RC. A majority also perceive that RC officers have a better understanding of the AC than do AC officers of the RC.

B. Question: Do AC officers have a superior attitude toward the RC?

Findings: Many AC officers acknowledge the existence of AC attitudes that can be characterized as "intolerant" and "superior" with regard to the RC. Fourteen percent acknowledge that RC commanders are rarely or never treated as equals by the AC. Six percent perceive that RC units are considered of little value by the AC. Only one-quarter would support assigning RC officers and non-commissioned officers to AC TOE units, including command.

C. Question: Are AC officers confident in Reservists' individual professional commitment, competence and availability for mobilization?

Findings: Many AC officers are not confident in Reservists' individual reliability as mobilization assets. Almost 40 percent believe that RC units have tended to be "social clubs" first and military organizations second. About two-thirds doubt that RC personnel are adequately trained to operate in their MOS from the first day of mobilization. One in four doubt that most (more than 90%) of RC personnel will report for duty when mobilized.

D. Question: Are AC officers confident in RC units' wartime mission capability and their availability for mobilization and deployment?

Findings: Many AC officers are not confident in the mission reliability of RC combat maneuver units. Only 43% believe that such units are always or usually reliable in combat. Active Army officers have greater confidence in the mission reliability of RC support units than in RC combat maneuver units. Eighty five percent believe that RC combat service support units can always or usually be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations. The majority of AC officers doubt that RC units can be ready for early deployment, and are opposed to shifting additional TOE missions to the RC. They are less opposed to shifting TDA missions to the RC.

E. Question: Do AC officers support or have confidence in current or proposed Army programs to enhance Total Army integration?

Findings: Many AC officers doubt the viability of the ROUNDOUT/ROUNDUP (RO/RU) program, one of the most visible and costly Total Army initiatives. Fifty-five percent do not believe

that the current RO/RU concept works; 17% indicate that RO/RU is not a good concept at any level of organization. Many agree that large RC combat units require extensive post-mobilization training before deployment, as currently required in operational plans. Active officers strongly support programs to provide special training on RC related subjects at Army professional education institutions, and to increase training support for RC units.

QUESTION: Do AC officers understand the RC?

FINDING 1: Many AC officers perceive that senior AC officers do not possess adequate knowledge about the Reserve Components.

Survey Results

1. In general, today's senior (colonel and above) Active Component officers possess adequate knowledge about the Reserve.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
00	24 (28%)	15 (18%)	44 (52%)	2 (2%)

2. In general, today's senior Active Component Army officers possess adequate knowledge about the National Guard?

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1 (1%)	26 (30%)	15 (17%)	38 (44%)	6 (7%)

FINDING 2: Many AC officers perceive that RC officers have a better understanding of the AC than do AC officers of the RC.

Survey Results

1. National Guard officers have a better understanding of the Active Component than do Active Component officers of the National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1 (1%)	14 (16%)	21 (24%)	49 (57%)	1 (1%)

2. Reserve officers have a better understanding of the Active Component than do Active Component officers of the Reserve.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
00	10 (12%)	29 (34%)	44 (52%)	2 (2%)

Discussion

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown (U.S.A., Ret), an informed commentator on AC/RC issues and former commander of 4th Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA), wrote in late 1991, "One of the greatest problems facing [RC] readiness is the paucity of AC leadership understanding" ²⁸ The survey results provide evidence that validates General Brown's assessment, revealing this view is widespread among the officer corps.

That AC officers do not understand the RC does not speak well for the effectiveness of three current Army programs:

A. Army school system. Previous studies found that there is a smattering of formal instruction on the RC at Army schools, but ". . . the current system is a 'hit or miss' proposition that relies heavily upon the individual officer's personal background and assignment experience" ²⁹ Officers who are not selected for resident schools are especially unlikely to gain any appreciable understanding of the RC.

B. Assignment of AC officers to work with RC, including assignments in Readiness Groups or as advisors to RC units. General Brown asserts, "Few current senior Army leaders have had substantive personal service with Reserves." ³⁰ The opportunities available to AC officers, especially brigadier or major generals, for such service were decreased when the readiness regions were disestablished.

There is some indication that assignment to a Readiness Group or as advisor to a RC unit is not "career-enhancing" for AC

officers. According to Brown ". . . promotions from those positions have been rare."³¹ Of the 87 Active Army respondents to the survey, only 6 had such prior service. This serves to validate prior research findings:

- Relatively ". . . few AC officers who are destined for the more important assignments in the Army will have worked with the [RC] in the first twenty years of their career. . .

- [B]y not assigning the top officers as advisors to [RC] units or to Readiness Groups, the Army bypasses a valuable educational process."³²

The U.S. Congress is aware of the importance of AC/RC interface at unit level, and the Army's failure to dedicate sufficient manpower resources for such purposes. The FY91 Defense Authorization Bill "require[d] a pilot study to provide [1300] active component (AC) advisors to [ARNG] units that have high priority for deployment."³³ This program was expanded to include USAR units and refined by provisions in FY92 and FY93 legislation.

C. CAPSTONE/ROUNDOUT/Annual Training Evaluations. These provide useful opportunities for AC soldiers to learn about the RC, however, they may provide inaccurate or incomplete "snapshots" of the RC unit's true ". . . ethos. . . challenges and the satisfaction of service in the RC."³⁴

The programs above have been in effect for years, yet the former Chief, U.S. Army Reserve observed in his long-range plan for 1990-2020:

"The USAR suffers from . . . a lack of understanding by the Active Army of the differences in the RC environment. This is a perennial problem that reflects lack of experience, primarily on the part of active component soldiers, with the operations, requirements, capabilities, and even equipment found in the reserves. While most reservists have had experience in the active component, the reverse is not true."³⁵

QUESTION: Do AC officers have a superior attitude toward the RC?

FINDING: Many AC officers acknowledge the existence of AC attitudes that can be characterized as "intolerant" and "superior" with regard to the RC.

Survey Results

1. Senior (O-6 and above) Reserve Component commanders are treated as equals by their Active Component counterparts.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
5 (6%)	25 (30%)	42 (50%)	11 (13%)	1 (1%)

2. Today, Reserve Component units are looked upon by the Active Component as:

Highly Valued	Somewhat Valued	Little Valued	Having no Value
27 (33%)	51 (61%)	5 (6%)	00

3. To truly implement the Total Force Policy, Reserve Component officers and NCOs should be assigned to positions in Active Component TOE units, to include command.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
17 (20%)	26 (31%)	16 (19%)	20 (23%)	6 (7%)

Only 30% of the officers would agree to this hypothetical "integration" initiative. However, many more officers (51%) would agree to the identical proposal for assigning AC personnel to RC units, as shown below.

4. To truly implement the Total Force Policy, Active Component officers and NCOs should be assigned to positions in Reserve Component TOE units, to include command.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
8 (9%)	17 (17%)	19 (22%)	34 (39%)	10 (12%)

Officer Comments:

- "As a general statement, I believe the active component has a lower regard for the Reserve Component than is merited by demonstrated performance." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service evaluating RC units.)

- "Not sure we need a national guard anymore. Maybe we should have state guards which are subject to very strict federal mobilization policies. . . Each state would pay for their Guard units; then they could be as good or political[ly] corrupt as the voters in each state will allow. Everything else would go into the Reserves where they can be integrated into a truly Total Army. (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as evaluator for RC units.)

- "The 90% of unit [personnel] who are not key personnel generally have a 'who cares' attitude about standards. This . . . may stem from overly-collegial climate in RC units." (Lieutenant colonel with prior service in Readiness Group.)

- "War, more than ever, is PhD level work which, notwithstanding the devotion and commitment of our RC forces and their leadership cannot be adequately confronted by [RC units]." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "The problem with the [R]eserve [C]omponents is they and us (sic) do not line up behind one commander. The reserves and active roger (sic) to the [Chief of Staff, Army]. The Guard rogers (sic) to 50 governors. One Total Army is a pipedream. (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service in Readiness Group.)

- "National Guard [it] could be argued is actually 50 + separate armies. Not all states do things [the] same way." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "National Guard wants USAR and AC to conform to National Guard ideals." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "Reservists I've observed in units are overly familiar with each other to the point of appearing non-professional." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

Discussion

Senior Army leaders publicly acknowledge the value of RC contributions to the Total Army, especially their contributions during the Gulf War. The Secretary of the Army had this to say in the February 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress:

"The soldiers who deployed to the Gulf were part of the Total Army--a team of regulars, guardsmen, reservists and Department of the Army civilians. All made significant contributions wherever they served. Overall, more than 147,000 Guardsmen and reservists were activated in 1,045 units. Together with the active forces, they executed not only one of the largest deployments of combat forces since World War II, but also one of the most rapid deployments of a large armored force in military history."³⁶

Reserve Component soldiers stood side by side with the regulars, accomplished their missions, and suffered casualties from hostile fire.

One might expect that the current state of AC/RC relations would be at a very high point but, based on survey results, that does not appear to be the case. Active officer comments reveal special animosity toward the ARNG. This may be the result of several factors not related to the demonstrated competence of many ARNG units.

First, there is longstanding historical antagonism between Regulars and citizen-soldiers. Even George Washington was disdainful of the capabilities of the militia: "To place any dependence upon the militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff."³⁷ These antagonisms continued through the Civil War and the World Wars, and still exist despite the contributions of Guard units in most of our larger military operations.

Second, ARNG units are state militia under the control of the respective governors and a politically appointed (or elected in one case) Adjutant General until federalized. This dual command and control arrangement disturbs some AC officers who view it as an impediment to effective military operations, although ". . . no one in the AC or RC questions the absolute primacy of the [Federal] chain of command when we go to war."³⁸

Third, AC officers are aware of recurring (albeit infrequent) financial and other impropriety involving Guard officers and commanders. These are resented because they may bring discredit on the Total Army via "guilt by association."

Fourth, some AC officers object to the perceived "collegial atmosphere" in Guard (and USAR) units between ranks. This is likely a result of the personnel stability in such units over extended periods of time, and the fact that Guard members often work together as civilians outside their military unit. The collegiality is viewed by some AC personnel as detrimental to "good military order and discipline," although its actual effect on unit effectiveness, if any, may be inconsequential.

Finally, as discussed later in the paper, the AC is well aware of the national political influence that resides in the RC, especially the ARNG, both through state political delegations and national associations. This is resented by some who perceive that it gives the Guard an unfair advantage in competition for resources.

The comments below by AC students at the Army War College are instructive:

"Can't have Total Force 'til (sic) all Forces act singularly under one Chief. Reserve/Guard talk of Total Force, but when decisions [were] made by Army regarding Total Force reductions, which may or may not have been correct, Reserve and Guard became independent. . . and sought to influence change in reductions through Congress. Total Force [policy] must apply across the board. . ."

and

"Threats of [ARNG] congressional mandate turn AC off."

QUESTION: Are AC officers confident in Reservists' individual, professional commitment, competence, and availability for mobilization?

FINDING: Many AC officers are not confident in Reservists' individual reliability as mobilization assets.

Survey Results

1. The Reserve Components have often tended to be "social clubs" first and military organizations second with members having little expectation of actually being mobilized for OCONUS combat operations.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
6 (7%)	23 (27%)	23 (27%)	31 (37%)	1 (1%)

2. Reserve Component personnel are adequately trained to operate in their MOS from the first day of mobilization.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
11 (13%)	43 (51%)	14 (17%)	16 (19%)	00

3. Upon receipt of a mobilization order, the Army can plan on more than 90% of all Reserve Component personnel to actually report to their units.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1 (1%)	21 (24%)	11 (13%)	44 (51%)	9 (10%)

Officer Comments

- "In general, the Guard is a club of 'good old boys.' Most are old, out of shape and when the time comes to deploy, don't... few serve in the reserves for love of country. Money talks!" (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "[Roundout] company level leadership not impressive; soldiers deserved better." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "Guard and Reserve people are as professional as active but it's easy for them to get their 'enthusiasm confused with their capabilities'" (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander who worked with the RC during Operation JUST CAUSE.)

- "Motivation and commitment [of RC personnel] to cause of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was lacking, primarily due to considerations of extended deployment on their individual business and careers. Very tight unit, well disciplined. . . although their methods appeared somewhat strange to a fulltime . . . soldier." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander.)

- "Many RC unit staff and commanders work an inordinate amount of non-pay time in their [reserve] jobs . . ." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service evaluating RC units and an assignment to Readiness Group.)

- "At the unit level, I think [RC] leaders and soldiers were very dedicated, enthusiastic and proud--AND hardworking." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

Discussion

The results here are mixed. Several officers express admiration for the professionalism and commitment of individual RC soldiers--they are "dedicated, enthusiastic, hardworking and proud." However, this does not necessarily translate into greater confidence in their military competence.

Almost two-thirds of the AC officers agree that most (90%) of RC personnel will report when ordered to mobilize. (During the mobilization for the Gulf War, most individual reservists reported for active duty when recalled, and most were capable of performing their assigned duties.)³⁹ But about two-thirds of AC students doubt that mobilized reservists are adequately trained to operate in their military specialty from day one of mobilization.

Most of the AC officers recognize requirements for some level of post-mobilization training for RC soldiers. Consequently, as senior leaders they could be expected to resist utilizing RC personnel and units for early deployment missions, e.g., the designated contingency force. In fact, the Army has structured its earliest deploying contingency force so that all the combat units and most of the support units are in the AC. Ostensibly, this is because the AC units are more "ready;" however, some proponents of the RC disagree. In their view, "If the readiness of some reserve units is lower than is necessary to meet short-notice contingencies, it indicates the need to devote more resources to equipping and training those [less costly reserve] units."⁴⁰ In addition, RC support units (e.g., transportation and quartermaster)

already proved their value as early deployers in the Gulf War. The competence of certain types of RC units for contingency operations has been demonstrated. Replacing them with active units in operational plans may not be a wise use of active or reserve personnel resources.⁴¹

More importantly, in failing to use RC personnel and units early in a contingency, the Army risks going to war without the "will of the people [C]itizen-soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve. . . serve as a bridge between the American people and their military. . .⁴² Involving the RC early in any operation, including a contingency, is absolutely essential for the well-being of the Army and its fragile relationship with the people."⁴³

QUESTION: Are AC officers confident in RC units' wartime mission capability and their availability for mobilization and deployment?

FINDING 1: Many AC officers are not confident in the mission reliability of RC combat maneuver units.

Survey Results

Reserve Component combat maneuver units (Armor, Mechanized, Infantry) can always/usually (43%) be relied upon in combat.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
4 (5%)	29 (38%)	37 (48%)	7 (9%)	00

Officer Comments

- "Combat arms units except S[pecial] F[orces] should not be in Reserve Components. . . You can't be combat ready (particularly armor, infantry, artillery and aviation) on 2-3 days of training per month. My son is in a Guard mechanized battalion and tells me his two days of drill per month actually means about six hours of quality training, and that the quality standard of training is not close to being what it was in his active infantry unit." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander.)

Discussion

Most of the officers do not express confidence in RC combat maneuver units. Only 43% of them believe that such units are always or usually reliable in combat. This opinion cannot be based on observed results, since Army RC combat maneuver units have not been employed in combat in appreciable numbers since the Korean War. More than likely, this lack of confidence is based, at least in part, on longstanding historical antagonism between the AC and RC.

"The roots of the antagonism between Regulars and citizen-soldiers go back to the American colonial period when British Crown

officers denigrated the ability of the militia and especially its officers [including] George Washington, a young militia officer from Virginia."⁴⁴ Later, then General Washington expressed his own doubts about the reliability of the militia.⁴⁵

This early animosity was exacerbated by the positions taken by a succession of influential leaders. These include General Emory Upton who "claimed the militia should only be used as a last resort because, among a host of reasons, its officers were utterly ignorant of the military art."⁴⁶ Later, General Lesley J. McNair, Commander Army Ground Forces complained that "the National Guard provided general officers who were not professional soldiers and who, almost without exception, were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to that rank."⁴⁷

The paradigm for AC/RC relationships was established long ago under very different national security circumstances, but its effects continue.

We must also recognize a possible and powerful disincentive for AC officers to acknowledge the capability and reliability of RC combat maneuver units--that is, such an admission could indirectly threaten their own career aspirations. Ultimate success in the AC and promotion to senior rank, especially for combat arms officers, is dependent on command assignments at battalion and brigade level. (Such assignments are centrally controlled and highly competitive, and a minority of eligible officers are selected (includes most USAWC graduates.)) If the AC publicly acknowledges the viability of RC combat units (that are also less costly), there could be

increased pressure from Congress to transfer missions and units to the RC. This would reduce command opportunities for AC combat arms officers and their ultimate career opportunity. Difficult to prove--Yes. But worthy of a second look as a "real-world" consideration.

FINDING 2: Many AC officers have greater confidence in the mission reliability of RC support units than in RC combat maneuver units.

Survey Results

1. Reserve Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support units generally can always/usually (69%) maintain a higher level of operational readiness than Reserve Component combat units.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
11 (13%)	47 (56%)	21 (25%)	5 (6%)	00

2. Reserve Component combat support (include field artillery and aviation) units can always/usually (73%) be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
11 (14%)	47 (59%)	20 (25%)	2 (2%)	00

3. Reserve Component combat service support units can always/usually (84%) be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
12 (15%)	57 (69%)	13 (16%)	00	00

Officer Comments

- "R[eserve] C[omponent] soldiers were assigned to my [Transportation Terminal Battalion] . . . level of training, professionalism, and . . . duty performance were excellent." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander who worked with RC unit during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.)

- "[Reserve component units,] e.g., Construction Engineer units [are] made up of highly qualified personnel who often perform military duties in civilian profession." (Lieutenant colonel with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "CSS [combat service support units] are held in higher esteem than are CS [combat support] and [CA] combat arms. I would value CA at little value, CS at some value and CSS at highly valued." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- ". . . CSS much better than combat arms. . ." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- Reserve Component units are looked upon by the Active Component as "somewhat valued: combat \leq 50%
combat support \geq 50%
CSS \geq 75%"

(Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "Personally, I believe fewer combat units should be assigned to the reserve components. The CS and CSS assets are perhaps better placed in Reserve." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

Discussion

Reserve component support units appear to be much more acceptable to AC officers as reliable partners in combat operations.

- 69% believe that RC support (CS/CSS) units are always or usually capable of maintaining a relatively higher level of operational readiness.

- 73% believe that RC combat support units can always or usually be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

- 85% believe that RC combat service support units can always or usually be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

Unlike their combat units, the Army mobilized and deployed RC support units for recent operations, including DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Active Army officers have had the opportunity to see these units perform their missions, to assess their performance, and to develop some level of confidence in their abilities.

Also, despite their importance, support units may be less "valued" by the Active Army than combat units, e.g., maneuver battalions with long historical traditions and regimental affiliations. Command of the latter is considered prestigious and necessary for AC combat arms officers who wish to compete for the most senior Army leadership positions. Consequently, under pressure of force structure and budget constraints, some AC officers may be more prone to:

1. Acknowledge the mission capability of RC support units.
2. Transfer support missions and units to the RC.

FINDING 3: Most AC officers doubt that RC units can be ready for early deployment, and are opposed to shifting additional TOE missions to the RC. They are less opposed to shifting TDA missions to the RC.

Survey Results

1. Prior to mobilization, Reserve Component units can train to the same readiness level as Active Component units.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
17 (20%)	51 (59%)	7 (8%)	8 (9%)	3 (4%)

2. Many Active Component TOE missions could be transferred to the Reserve Component with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
11 (13%)	52 (61%)	10 (12%)	11 (13%)	1 (1%)

3. Many Active Component TDA missions could be transferred to the Reserve Components with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
5 (6%)	25 (29%)	21 (24%)	33 (38%)	2 (2%)

Officer Comments

- "A[ctive] C[omponent] maneuver combat [units] have trouble doing well at the [combat training centers] and even more trouble sustaining what they have learned . . . RC maneuver units simply cannot hope to do better. (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "Three areas need fixing: active Army 1R evaluation [of RC units], National Guard noncommissioned officer leadership, and ... battle focus." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "I don't believe RC units can be as ready as their AC counterparts. They should not expect to be nor should they be expected to be as ready. It is more important to have an accurate assessment of the post-mob (sic) training time necessary." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "War . . . cannot be adequately confronted by anything less than combat elements that train continually throughout the year." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "Combat support USAR units I dealt with during DESERT STORM were quite proficient in 'specific MOS' but were lacking in basic soldier skills, and the officers had difficulty coordinating missions and fitting their units into the plan of the larger organization." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander who worked with RC units during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.)

Discussion

Only 13% of the officers believe that RC units can train to the same readiness levels as AC units prior to mobilization. (Readiness, as defined by JCS, is ". . . the ability of forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment . . . to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays.")⁴⁸ Over half believe that transfer of "many" TOE missions to the RC would cause a reduced level of mission capability, and about one third believe the same of TDA mission transfers to the RC.

These responses reflect the AC belief that most RC units require some extended period of post-mobilization training. This is surprising in view of the results of RC mobilization for the Gulf War. In its after action report, the Department of Defense concluded:

"Most units of the Reserve Components were ready to be deployed on schedule and the timing and sequence of their deployment was determined by the needs of the theater commanders and similar factors, rather than by post-mobilization training requirements. Prior to ODS/S, reported. . . data, which is an indicator of readiness, showed that reserve component CS/CSS units were about as ready as similar active units." About 70 percent of all active and reserve units were at C-3 or higher which means they were ready to accomplish at least a major portion of their wartime mission. About 10 to 20 percent of units were at C-4. About 15 percent of units reported C-5. The readiness of those reserve units that were actually called up was somewhat higher."⁴⁹

FINDING 4: Active component officers are aware of the political influence that resides in the RC, especially the National Guard, and believe that political considerations will affect the availability of RC units for operations.

Survey Results

1. Compared to the Active Army, how much influence do you believe the Army National Guard has with Congress?

- 50 (58%) Much more than the Active Army
- 25 (29%) Somewhat more than the Active Army
- 9 (11%) About the same as the Active Army
- 2 (2%) Somewhat less than the Active Army
- 00 (0%) Much less than the Active Army

2. Compared to the Active Army, how much influence do you believe the Army Reserve has with Congress?

- 19 (23%) Much more than the Active Army
- 24 (29%) Somewhat more than the Active Army
- 25 (30%) About the same as the Active Army
- 14 (17%) Somewhat less than the Active Army
- 2 (2%) Much less than the Active Army

3. Compared to the Army National Guard, how much influence do you believe the Army Reserve has with Congress?

- 2 (2%) Much more than the Guard
- 2 (2%) Somewhat more than the Guard
- 13 (16%) About the same as the Guard
- 44 (52%) Somewhat less than the Guard
- 23 (27%) Much less than the Guard

4. Political considerations will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Reserve Component units for any future contingency.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
3 (4%)	21 (24%)	7 (8%)	45 (52%)	10 (12%)

Discussion

About 80% of the AC officers believe that the ARNG has greater influence with Congress than the Active Army and the USAR. Over half believe the USAR enjoys a similar advantage over the Active Army. Almost two-thirds of the AC officers believe that political considerations will affect whether RC units will be rapidly mobilized and available for future contingencies. It is unclear whether the "political considerations" refer to Presidential prerogatives "to use mobilization as an instrument of policy, while remaining attentive to the domestic political situation,"⁵⁰ or to the concern over possible interference by state governors.

Prior to the Gulf War, some doubted that the President and other political leaders would ever be willing to use reserves for operations short of global war. "The experience in [the Gulf War] should have calmed those concerns."⁵¹ The President declared a national emergency early and reservists were subsequently called to active duty in large numbers.

Concern over possible interference in mobilization by state governors was addressed directly by legislation in 1986:

"The consent of a Governor. . . may not be withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty."⁵²

QUESTION: Do AC officers support or have confidence in current Army programs to enhance Total Army integration?

FINDING 1 : Many AC officers doubt the viability of the ROUNDOUT/ROUNDUP (RO/RU) program, one of the most visible and costly initiatives to promote Total Army integration.

Survey Results

1. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard roundout/roundup maneuver combat brigades to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat?

5 (6%)	0-30 days	13 (15%)	121-180 days
8 (10%)	31-60 days	3 (4%)	181-270 days
28 (33%)	61-90 days	00 (0%)	271-360 days
26 (31%)	91-120 days	1 (1%)	more than 360 days

2. In your opinion, roundout/roundup is a good concept at which levels of organization. Check all that apply.

24 (28%) Platoon

28 (33%) Company

45 (53%) Battalion

25 (31%) Brigade

14 (17%) Roundout is not a good concept

3. Active Component CAPSTONE and Roundout headquarters have done their best to make CAPSTONE and Roundout programs work.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
4 (5%)	10 (12%)	33 (39%)	35 (41%)	3 (4%)

Less than half of the respondents agree that AC CAPSTONE and Roundout headquarters have "done their best" to make these two programs work. The structure of the question does not distinguish between responses related to the CAPSTONE program vice the Roundout

program. But the comments from respondents indicate deep concern about the viability of roundout units, with almost no mention of the CAPSTONE program.

The Chief of Staff continues to emphasize the Roundout program: "I want to focus on the Roundout Brigades, defining their roles and requirements." (emphasis added).⁵³ The majority of the respondents to the survey do not agree that the current approach is effective:

4. In your opinion, roundout/roundup, as currently conducted, works.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
7 (8%)	40 (47%)	18 (21%)	19 (22%)	1 (1%)

Officer Comments:

- "I spent 40 days at NTC . . . [assisting in evaluating] 48th IN Bde(M) [a roundout unit] . . . The "NTC leadership changed the training plan so often . . . that I'm not sure the 48th ever really knew what their goal/mission was." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander.)

- "My roundout [Engineer] company was not impressive. Unit activities more focused on recruiting/retention to maintain strength than to achieve readiness." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service evaluating ARNG/USAR units.)

- "I feel strongly that Roundout battalions are the only viable option (emphasis added). Much easier to deploy and train-up Guard battalions by integrating them with existing active brigades in the combat zone. [It is] unrealistic to expect Guard [Roundout] forces to sustain same level of readiness as like Active Component." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander who observed the Guard/Reserve during operations and joint exercises.)

- "The 'roundout' concept for an early deploying combat unit is, in my opinion, completely wrong headed. . . We will send innocent youngsters to an early grave if we believe and convince ourselves that [RC] combat units can or should deploy early." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service evaluating ARNG armor units.)

Discussion

Active component officers do not have much confidence in the Roundout/Roundup program as a means of preparing RC units for early deployment missions:

- 51% believe RO/RU combat units will require more than 90 days post-mobilization training before deployment. This is a longer period than assumed in current operational plans.
- 55% do not believe that the current RO/RU concept works.
- 17% indicate that RO is not a good concept at any level of organization.

The Army RO program dates from the early 1970s. "Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted: 'We know from experience that a [RC] brigade can be made ready for deployment much sooner than a [RC] division. Hence the emphasis is being placed on brigades. . . for the early deployment role (emphasis added).'"⁵⁴ Congress supported the program with greatly increased funding but began to question its implementation, specifically, Army plans for deployment of RO brigades. During Congressional hearings in 1988, for example, Senator Alan J. Dixon considered testimony from the Army and the General Accounting Office and concluded, "The round-out brigade in the National Guard is then a fiction, and I don't mean to over simplify it."⁵⁵

More recently, their availability and readiness for the Gulf War is the subject of heated controversy. Despite their reported readiness, priority for resourcing and training focus, the RO brigades were not as ready for deployment as expected by planners

and trainers.⁵⁶ They required extensive post-mobilization training and were not deployed to the theater of war.

Many officers do believe in the viability of RO at lower levels of organization, e.g., battalion (53%), company (33%) and platoon (28%). Their opinions may be based on their personal experiences in training at the lower level and their observations while evaluating smaller RC units. They may also be influenced by the success of the U.S. Marine Corps deployment of reserve combat units during the Gulf War.

Marine reserve combat units are typically organized at battalion and company level and are strongly augmented by active duty Marines. These smaller units can be integrated more easily into active Marine units for combat operations than larger units. The Marine experience during the Gulf War was that smaller RC units can be used effectively and relatively early in combat.⁵⁷ "On average, the time between activation and deployment was about one month."⁵⁸

According to General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps:

"They did do well . . . [T]hey came when they were called, they came in the numbers in which they were called, and they did what they were supported to do."⁵⁹

FINDING 2: Many AC officers agree that large RC combat units require extensive post-mobilization training before deployment, as currently required in operational plans.

Survey Results

1. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard combat divisions to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat?

1 (1%)	0-30 days	17 (20%)	121-180 days
3 (4%)	31-60 days	12 (14%)	181-270 days
12 (14%)	61-90 days	20 (24%)	271-360 days
16 (19%)	91-120 days	3 (4%)	more than 360 days

2. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard Field Artillery and Aviation brigades to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat.

4 (5%)	0-30 days	12 (15%)	121-180 days
19 (23%)	31-60 days	3 (4%)	181-270 days
25 (30%)	61-90 days	00 (1%)	271-360 days
18 (22%)	91-120 days	1 (1%)	more than 360 days

Officer Comments

- "If a unit/force is expected to be available for rapid deployment/force projection then it should be in the . . . AC [whether] combat, combat support or combat service support. (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator and with BOLD SHIFT experience.)

- ". . . it took the entire [Special Forces] Group to meet the early deployment requirement of one battalion" (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander who has prior service with RC Special Forces units during a mobilization exercise.)

Discussion

The Army Chief of Staff testified in Congress that ARNG divisions might take up to a year of training to become combat ready.⁶⁰ (Interestingly, over half of the survey respondents believe it would require much less time--180 days or less.)

Over half of the officers indicate that RC field artillery and aviation brigades require 90 days or less for post-mobilization training. In the Gulf War, such units were deployed and engaged in combat operations. Two of the ARNG artillery brigades, the 142d and 196th, were cited for "making a substantial contribution to the Army's firepower in the desert."⁶¹

FINDING 3: Many AC officers support programs to provide special training on RC related subjects at Army professional education institutions.

Survey Results

1. Do you believe separate blocks of instruction should be dedicated to Reserve Component subjects at Army career development courses?

36 (42%) Yes, should be separate blocks of instruction.

50 (58%) No, should be integrated throughout the instruction.

00 (0%) No, should not be included in the career development courses.

2. At which Army school/s do you believe Reserve Component issues and considerations should be taught? Check all that apply.

52 (50%) Officer Basic

80 (92%) Officer Advanced

61 (70%) CAS3

86 (99%) CGSC

78 (90%) USAWC

6 (7%) Other (ICAF, NWC, All)

00 (0%) There is no need to dedicate instruction to these issues

Discussion

All respondents agree that there should be special training on RC issues and considerations at one or more Army schools. One officer commented,

"I believe Reserve Component structure, organization and roles/missions should be taught at Army schools for both officers and noncommissioned officers. Those who have never worked with the RC hold several misconceptions."

FINDING 4: Many AC officers support programs to increase Army training assistance for RC units.

Survey Results

The Active Component must become more involved with training the Reserve Components.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1 (1%)	7 (8%)	8 (9%)	50 (58%)	21 (24%)

Officer Comments

- "... we really need to start helping/training these units . . . We also need to change the mindset of the [RC] units. They need to use their training time more effectively; need to be tougher [not] just going through the motions. . . If we do not help train and make these units better they will never help us in the next war." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "BOLD SHIFT's stated [training] objectives are a target, but if we don't see dramatic improvement within 3 years, we need to cut bait (sic) and let the [RC] concentrate on reconstitution." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "... [RC] units need more fulltime staff to cope with [administration] so commanders have more training focus and unit members come to well-organized drills with training value." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service in Readiness Group and as RC unit evaluator.)

- "... strongly agree that active component officers and NCOs should be more involved with RC training. There are all kinds of ways to assist without doing it for them." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "... must TRAIN the TRAINER--not train reserve units!" (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "What is critical is not the individual [training] but rather his unit's collective training time--this is what determines readiness and, therefore, deployability." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

- "... generally agree [but] a very dangerous question. A truthful answer is too dangerous to the already over-committed, shrinking AC." (Lieutenant colonel, former battalion commander with prior service as RC unit evaluator.)

Discussion

The great majority (82%) of the respondents agree that the AC must enhance its training support for RC units. Several officers also commented on specific ways in which the RC can improve its own training programs. These include:

- More effective use of available training time
- Tougher training programs
- Commander focus on training, not administration
- More emphasis on collective training

One officer voiced concern that a shrinking, over-committed AC may not be able to assume a greater role in training the RC.

Conclusions

Achieving full integration of all Army components into a Total Force is unlikely until there are significant changes in how the components communicate and cooperate. Communication between the Army components, between the Army and the Congress, and between the Army and the American people is clouded by misunderstanding, prejudice, self-interest, and unrealistic expectations. The results in peacetime are animosity between the components, lost credibility for the Army with Congress and the public, and cutthroat competition for resources. The harmful results during combat operations could be much more severe.

The difficulties are caused, in part, because AC officers do not understand the RC--their ethos, challenges, requirements, capabilities and, yes, their limitations. Additionally, there are a number of AC "attitudinal obstacles" that impede progress toward realization of a true Total Army. These include attitudes of intolerance and superiority.

The Army would be served better by "closing ranks" and embarking on a new era of frank and honest communication, cooperation and mutual support.⁶² A critical first step is to acknowledge that prejudices and stereotypes exist and work together to eliminate them. This survey of the attitudes and perceptions of the next generation of Active Army leaders can provide a basis for the first steps in such a cooperative effort.

Recommendations

All three components should agree to meet for the specific purpose to:

- "o Take the gloves off . . . [in a no holds barred forum];
- o Admit faults and address perceptions [including those attitudes and perceptions identified in this survey];
- o Identify the problems. . .;
- o [Develop a plan to] [r]esolve those problems; and,
- o Implement and follow-up."⁶³

Attendees should be only senior AC and RC leaders who are empowered to make decisions for their components. The decisions should be communicated to every level of military organization.

One essential written product should be a clearly defined statement of roles and missions for each of the components based on their unique competencies and capabilities. Additionally, there should be a plan for follow-on meetings and actions. The roles and missions document and the action plan should be endorsed by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, the Director, Army National Guard and the Chief, Army Reserve, and used as the basis for Army training, career development and force structuring.

Following the initial meeting, the Army should begin immediately to initiate a series of meaningful actions to demonstrate high level, sustained commitment to the new era of AC/RC communication and cooperation. These actions could include, for example:

- o Mandatory instruction about the RC at all career development courses, for officers and non-commissioned officers

- o A "constituency conference" of private organizations that support the Army (AUSA, ROA, NGAUS, etc.)
- o Joint AC/RC commander's conferences
- o Increased RC staffing at TRADOC schools
- o Increased RC billets at Army Senior Service Colleges
- o Assignment of more AC senior officers to the RC and vice versa
- o Increased AC emphasis on RC-related assignments for purposes of career development and promotion⁶⁴

This list is not inclusive. (More suggestions are in Colonel David E. Shaver's study, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony.) The results could be a significant, initial step toward eliminating the misunderstanding and miscommunication that plague our efforts to become a truly integrated Total Army.

The Army should conduct a study of the efforts by other Services to integrate their respective RC into the Total Force. The U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have all approached the challenge differently, and have had some notable successes. There are probably lessons that the U.S. Army could learn from their experiences and apply to our own force.

Finally, the Army should institutionalize a system to periodically measure the success of Army integration initiatives over an extended period. This should include surveying on a recurring basis the leadership and ranks of all components. (As noted before, the RC also exhibit attitudes that inhibit Total Army integration.) This will provide the Army with data required to determine which programs are effective and to eliminate programs

that are ineffectual in moving the Army toward a "total force. . . in word and fact."⁶⁵

All components would benefit from sustained leadership actions to improving communications and facing the hard issues openly and honestly. Benefits for the Total Army and the nation would include:

- o An Active Component which provides for the Reserve Components as a high priority
- o An Active Component knowledgeable of Reserve Component capabilities and limitations
- o Enhanced mutual respect among components
- o A unified budget stance for the Total Army
- o Active Army understanding of its primary constituency (the RC) and how to use grassroots political influence to benefit the Total Army
- o A trust, a new harmony in Active Component/Reserve Component relations⁶⁶

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Profile of AC Officer Respondents
(USAWC Students)

1. What is your component?

87 (100%) Active

(Responses from thirteen Reserve Component officers not included in this study.)

2. What is your basic branch?

4 (5%)	Aviation	1 (1%)	Chemical
10 (12%)	Engineer	8 (9%)	Field Artillery
14 (16%)	Infantry	2 (2%)	Med Service
2 (2%)	Med Corps	5 (6%)	Ordnance
4 (5%)	Quartermaster	3 (3%)	Signal Corps
2 (2%)	Adjutant General	00 (0%)	Finance
8 (9%)	Armor	4 (5%)	Military Police
3 (3%)	Transportation	2 (2%)	Judge Adv General
00 (0%)	Civil Affairs	2 (2%)	Air Defense
8 (9%)	Military Intell	1 (1%)	Chaplain
3 (3%)	Special Forces	1 (1%)	Other

3. Source of Commission

15 (17%)	USMA
59 (68%)	ROTC
10 (12%)	OCS
00 (0%)	State Military Academy OCS
3 (3%)	Other

4. Years of Service: 21.5 years (mean).

5. Current Rank?

56 (64%)	Lieutenant Colonel
25 (29%)	Lieutenant Colonel (promotable)
6 (7%)	Colonel

6. Command at battalion level?

79 (91%)	Yes
8 (9%)	No

7. Did you serve in Southwest Asia during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM or afterwards to retrograde equipment?

35 (41%)	DESERT SHIELD
37 (43%)	DESERT STORM
3 (4%)	PROVIDE COMFORT
3 (4%)	Retrograde of equipment

8. Have you ever been assigned to a Readiness Region?

4 (5%) Yes
82 (95%) No

9. Have you ever been assigned as advisor to an Army National Guard unit?

2 (2%) Yes
84 (98%) No

10. Have you ever been assigned as advisor to an Army Reserve unit?

86 (100%) No

11. Have you ever evaluated a National Guard unit at annual training?

40 (50%) Yes
40 (50%) No

12. Have you ever evaluated an Army Reserve unit at annual training?

26 (30%) Yes
60 (70%) No

13. Have you ever served in an Active Component unit that had a National Guard roundout unit?

34 (40%) Yes
50 (60%) No

14. Have you ever served in an Active Component unit that had an Army Reserve roundout unit?

1 (1%) Yes

15. Were you ever or are you now a member of a Reserve Component unit?

7 (8%) Yes (Does not include thirteen officers who are currently in the USAR or ARNG)

16. Have you ever worked with or closely observed the National Guard/Reserve during:

8 (9%) JUST CAUSE	6 (7%) BLAZING TRAILS/FUERTES CAMINO
34 (40%) DESERT SHIELD	27 (31%) REFORGER
29 (33%) DESERT STORM	5 (6%) BRIGHT STAR
2 (2%) PROVIDE COMFORT	17 (20%) TEAM SPIRIT
14 (16%) NTC Rotation	8 (9%) OTHER JCS Exercise

17. If you worked with or closely observed RC units mobilized during DESERT SHIELD/STORM, how would you rate their combat effectiveness?

00 (0%) Fully combat ready, 0-14 days additional training required
 15 (21%) Somewhat ready, 15-28 days additional training required
 5 (7%) Marginally combat ready, 29-45 days additional training required
 1 (1%) Not ready, 46-90 days additional training required
 4 (6%) Not ready, 91-180 days additional training required

18. Have you participated in a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation?

44 (51%) Yes
 43 (49%) No

19. How would you rate the effectiveness of your CTC experience in relation to your other leader development?

Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Marginal	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
00	00	00	6 (14%)	38 (86%)

20. Did you receive formal instruction on the Army National Guard at the following schools? Check all that apply.

18 (21%)	Officer Basic	48 (50%)	CGSC
45 (52%)	Officer Advanced	21 (24%)	AFSC
2 (2%)	CAS3	4 (5%)	Other

21. Did you receive formal instruction on the Army Reserve at the following schools? Check all that apply.

19 (22%)	Officer Basic	47 (55%)	CGSC
45 (53%)	Officer Advanced	22 (20%)	AFSC
3 (4%)	CAS3	4 (5%)	Other

KNOWLEDGE/PERCEPTIONS

OF


ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

SUSPENSE: 25 Nov 92

MEMORANDUM FOR ARMY STUDENTS, USAWC CLASS OF 93

SUBJECT: Knowledge/Perceptions of Army Reserve Components

1. In the post-Cold War period, the question of proper force mix and appropriate roles and missions between Army Active and Reserve Components is a matter of debate. The question of Reserve Component readiness is a major factor in these debates. To assist in a continuing review of the AC/RC issue, request your cooperation in completing the attached questionnaire.
2. Results will provide background data to be utilized by the undersigned and analysts assigned to Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), USAWC. Survey results, with appropriate analysis, will be provided to Department of the Army leaders and staff, including the Director, Army National Guard and the Chief, Army Reserve. Conclusions and recommendations drawn from your responses will be offered these leaders and their staffs to assist them in restructuring the total Army, and for course development in the Army school system.
3. Your assistance in completing the survey is greatly appreciated. It should not take more than forty-five minutes to complete. Please return the completed form through the mail room to LTC Mike Harrison, Box 131.



Michael L. Harrison
Lieutenant Colonel, IN

=====

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE: AR 70-1

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 4503

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE/S:

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interest of the research, but there will be no affect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information.

RESERVE COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your component?

87 Active
07 Army Reserve
06 National Guard

2. What is your basic branch?

<u>04</u> Aviation	<u>05</u> Ordnance	<u>03</u> Transportation
<u>01</u> Chemical	<u>04</u> Quartermaster	<u>02</u> JAG
<u>10</u> Engineer	<u>03</u> Signal Corps	<u>00</u> Civil Affairs
<u>08</u> Field Artillery	<u>02</u> AG	<u>02</u> Air Defense
<u>14</u> Infantry	<u>00</u> Finance	<u>08</u> Military Intl
<u>02</u> Medical Service	<u>08</u> Armor	<u>01</u> Chaplain
<u>02</u> Medical Corps	<u>04</u> Military Police	<u>03</u> Special Forces
<u>01</u> Other (Please Specify) -----		

3. Source of commission?

15 USMA
59 ROTC
10 OCS
00 State Military Academy OCS
03 Other (Please Specify)

4. Years of Service? 21.05 yrs (mean)

5. Current Rank?

56 LTC
25 LTC(P)
06 COL

6. How many months have you commanded at the following levels?

Platoon 17 months (mean)

Company 23 months (mean)

Battalion 22 months (mean)

Brigade 00 months

7. Did you serve in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield and/or Storm or afterwards to retrograde equipment? (Check all applicable)

- 35 Desert Shield
- 37 Desert Storm
- 03 Provide Comfort
- 03 Retrograde of Equipment
- 44 Did not serve in any of the above

8. If you are an Active Component officer, have you ever been assigned to a Readiness Region or as an advisor to an Army National Guard or Army Reserve unit? Check all that apply.

- 04 Yes - Readiness Group
- 02 Yes - National Guard advisor
Type/Size of unit -----
- 00 Yes - Reserve advisor
Type/Size of unit -----
- No

9. If you are an Active Component officer, have you ever evaluated a Reserve Component unit at Annual Training? Check all that apply.

- 46 Yes - National Guard unit
Type/Size of unit -----
- 26 Yes - Reserve unit
Type/Size of unit -----
- No

10. Have you ever served in an Active Component unit that had a Reserve Component roundout unit? Check all that apply.

- 34 Yes - Unit with National Guard Roundout unit
- 01 Yes - unit with Reserve Roundout unit
- 84 No roundout units
- 13 I am in the National Guard/Reserve

11. Were you ever or are you now a member of a Reserve Component unit?

- 05 Yes
- 22 No
- 06 I am in the National Guard
- 07 I am in the Army Reserve

12. Have you ever worked with or closely observed the National Guard/Reserve during any of the following?
Check all that apply.

- 08 Operation Just Cause
- 34 Operation Desert Shield
- 29 Operation Desert Storm
- 02 Operation Provide Comfort
- 14 National Training Center Rotation
- 06 Blazing Trails/Fuertes Camino
- 27 REFORGER
- 05 Bright Star
- 17 Team Spirit
- 08 Other JCS sponsored exercise: Name of Exercise_____
- 12 Never have worked with the National Guard/Reserve

13. If you deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Shield/Storm with an Active Component combat unit (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Aviation), how would you rate your unit's combat readiness upon arrival in the theater?

- 50 Did not deploy with a combat unit
- 27 Fully combat ready, 0-14 days additional training required
- 02 Somewhat combat ready, 15-28 days additional training required
- 00 Marginally combat ready, 29-45 days additional training required
- 00 Not ready to conduct combat operations, 46-90 days of additional training required
- 00 Not ready to conduct combat operations, 91-180 days of additional training required

14. If you worked with or closely observed Reserve Component units mobilized during Desert Shield/Storm, how would you rate their combat readiness?

- 32 Did not deploy with a combat unit
00 Fully combat ready, 0-14 days additional training required
15 Somewhat combat ready, 15-28 days additional training required
05 Marginally combat ready, 29-45 days additional training required
01 Not ready to conduct combat operations, 46-90 days of additional training required
04 Not ready to conduct combat operations, 91-180 days of additional training required — Fully ready
13 Did not work with RC units during Desert Shield/Storm
06 I am in the National Guard
07 I am in the Army Reserve

15. Listed below are training simulation devices that have been used for leader development. Rate the effectiveness of each device you have used by circling the number in the appropriate column for the simulation listed in the left column.

	<u>Very</u> <u>Ineffective</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>Ineffective</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>Effective</u>	<u>Very</u> <u>Effective</u>
MCOFT	1	2	3	4 1	5 1
UCOFT	1	2	3	4 10	5 8
ICOFT	1 2	2	3	4 4	5 6
Dunn/Kempf	1 2	2	3	4 3	5 2
Artbass	1	2	3	4 28	5 4
BASE	1 1	2	3	4 6	5 1
BCTP	1	2	3 2	4 15	5 34
SIMNET	1	2	3	4 14	5 9
=====					

16. Have you participated in a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation?

44 Yes Location _____
Your Military Position/s _____
43 No

17. How would you rate the effectiveness of your CTC experience in relation to your other leader development?
Circle your response.

Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Marginal	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
0	0	0	6	38

NATIONAL GUARD SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

Questions 18 - 32 focus strictly on your knowledge/perceptions about and experiences with the Army National Guard.

18. Have you ever received formal instruction on the National Guard at any Army school?

-- Yes - Check all that apply.
18 Officer Basic School
45 Officer Advanced School
02 CAS3
42 CGSC
21 Armed Forces Staff College
04 Other (Please specify) _____
-- No

19. In general, today's senior Active Component Army officers possess adequate knowledge about the National Guard?

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1	26	15	38	6

20. National Guard officers have a better understanding of the Active Component than do Active Component officers of the National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1	14	21	49	1

21. National Guard personnel are paid for drill attendance with:

18 State Funds
41 Federal funds
24 Don't know

22. The role of a National Guard State Area Command (STARC), is:
Check all that apply.

16 Command all National Guard units in the state
24 Act as a resource headquarters
27 Responsible for mobilization of units in the state
20 Provide staff for the State Adjutant General
06 State only function - no federal activities or connection
41 Don't know

23. Promotion requirements (time in grade, education, etc.) for National Guard soldiers are the same as for Active Component soldiers.

06 True
57 False
23 Don't know

24. Promotion requirements (time in grade, education, etc.) for National Guard soldiers are the same as for Army Reserve soldiers.

09 True
36 False
40 Don't know

25. National Guard Bureau exercises command and control over all National Guard units.

08 True
67 False
11 Don't know

26. National Guard Bureau serves as the channel of communication between the states and the Department of the Army.

20 True
04 False
12 Don't know

27. National Guard Bureau, by law, is staffed by more Active Component personnel than National Guard personnel.

00 True
18 False
68 Don't know

28. CONUSAs command, control, and approve training for National Guard units in their areas.

16 True
32 False
36 Don't know

29. National Guard maneuver combat battalions and brigades are generally at what level of readiness?

04 C-1
13 C-2
24 C-3
05 C-4
00 C-5
37 Don't know

30. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard combat divisions to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat?

<u>01</u> 0-30 days	<u>17</u> 121-180 days
<u>03</u> 31-60 days	<u>12</u> 181-270 days
<u>12</u> 61-90 days	<u>20</u> 271-360 days
<u>16</u> 91-120 days	<u>03</u> more than 360 days

31. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard roundout/roundup maneuver combat brigades to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat?

<u>05</u> 0-30 days	<u>13</u> 121-180 days
<u>08</u> 31-60 days	<u>03</u> 181-270 days
<u>28</u> 61-90 days	<u>00</u> 271-360 days
<u>26</u> 91-120 days	<u>01</u> more than 360 days

32. In general, how long should the Army plan for National Guard Field Artillery and Aviation brigades to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment for combat?

<u>04</u> 0-30 days	<u>12</u> 121-180 days
<u>19</u> 31-60 days	<u>03</u> 181-270 days
<u>25</u> 61-90 days	<u>00</u> 271-360 days
<u>18</u> 91-120 days	<u>01</u> more than 360 days

ARMY RESERVE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

Questions 33 - 42 focus strictly on your knowledge/perceptions about and experiences with the Army Reserve.

33. Have you ever received formal instruction on the Army Reserve at any Army school?

-- Yes - Check all that apply.

<u>19</u> Officer Basic School
<u>45</u> Officer Advanced School
<u>03</u> CAS3
<u>47</u> CGSC
<u>22</u> Armed Forces Staff College
Other (Please specify) _____

-- No

34. In general, today's senior (Colonel and above) Active Component Army officers possess adequate knowledge about the Reserve.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
0	24	15	44	2

35. Reserve officers have a better understanding of the Active Component than do Active Component officers of the Reserve.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
10	0	29	44	2

36. Reserve officers generally have little or no active duty experience.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
14	56	11	3	0

37. Reserve conventional forces based in CONUS are commanded by the Chief, Army Reserve.

17 True
41 False
26 Don't know

38. Promotion requirements (time in grade, education, etc.) for Reserve soldiers are the same as for and Active Component soldiers.

18 True
41 False
26 Don't know

39. Reserve units have non-federal missions similar to National Guard units.

04 True
70 False
11 Don't know

40. Reserve units must be federalized by Presidential authority before they can be called into active duty.

12 True
65 False
08 Don't know

41. Reserve units are mostly Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS).

77 True
04 False
04 Don't know

42. All Reserve soldiers are assigned to units.

01 True
81 False
03 Don't know

ATTITUDES ABOUT AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Unless specified differently, the remaining questions use the term 'Reserve Components' as inclusive of both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

43. Some units in the Army structure are found only in the Reserve Components.

81 True
00 False
05 Don't know

44. Some Reserve Component units have early deployment (M to M+15) missions in Army contingency plans.

69 True
03 False
14 Don't know

45. Today, Reserve Component units are looked upon by the Active Component as:

27 Highly valued
51 Somewhat valued
05 Little valued
00 Having no value

46. Most Reserve Component commanders and principal staff officers average how many days per year performing their military duties?

02 0-35
15 36-55
08 56-65
12 66-75
13 75-85
26 more than 85
10 Don't know

47. In your opinion, roundout/roundup is a good concept at which levels of organization. Check all that apply.

24 Platoon
 22 Company
 45 Battalion
 26 Brigade
 14 Roundout is not a good concept

48. In your opinion, roundout/roundup, as currently conducted, works.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
7	40	18	19	1

49. Senior (O-6 and above) Reserve Component commanders are treated as equals by their Active Component counterparts.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
5	25	42	11	1

50. Reserve Component combat maneuver units (Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Infantry) can ----- be relied upon in combat.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
4	29	37	7	0

51. Reserve Component combat support (include field artillery and aviation) units can ----- be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
11	47	20	2	0

52. Reserve Component combat service support units can ----- be relied upon in combat or in support of combat operations.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
12	57	13	0	0

53. Reserve Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support units generally can maintain a higher level of operational readiness than Reserve Component Combat units.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
11	47	21	5	0

54. Reserve Component units use the same criteria as Active Component units when developing their Mission Essential Task List (METL).

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
19	46	12	4	0

55. Reserve Component units are graded by the same criteria as Active Component units when conducting an external ARTEP.

Always	Usually	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
16	26	20	19	0

56. Do you believe separate blocks of instruction should be dedicated to Reserve Component subjects at Army career development courses?

36 Yes, should be separate blocks of instruction

50 No, should be intergrated throughout the instruction

00 No, should not included in the career development courses

57. At which Army school/s do you believe Reserve Component issues and considerations should be taught? Check all that apply.

52 Officer Basic

80 Officer Advanced

61 CAS3

96 CGSC

78 USAWC

06 Other

00 There is no need to dedicate instruction to these issues

The following is a list of statements about the Reserve Components. Circle the answer which most closely reflects how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.

58. The Reserve Components have often tended to be 'social clubs' first and military organizations second with members having little expectation of actually being mobilized for OCONUS combat operations.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
6	23	23	31	1

59. Reserve Component personnel are adequately trained to operate in their MOS from the first day of mobilization.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
11	43	14	16	0

60. Many Active Component TOE missions could be transferred to the Reserve Components with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
11	52	10	11	1

61. Many Active Component TDA missions could be transferred to the Reserve Components with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
5	25	21	33	2

62. Prior to mobilization, Reserve Component units should train to the same readiness level as Active Component units.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1	31	4	33	15

63. Prior to mobilization, Reserve Component units can train to the same readiness level as Active Component units.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
17	51	7	8	3

64. With limited days of training available per year, it is unreasonable to expect Reserve Component maneuver combat units to be deployable sooner than 90 days after mobilization.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
5	7	3	36	34

65. With limited days of training available per year, it is unreasonable to expect Reserve Component non-maneuver combat units to be deployable to a combat theater sooner than 90 days after mobilization.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
2	36	7	31	9

66. With limited days of training available per year, it is unreasonable to expect Reserve Component non-maneuver combat units to be deployable to a combat theater sooner than 30 days after mobilization.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
2	11	7	44	21

67. Upon receipt of a mobilization order, the Army can plan on more than 90% of all Reserve Component personnel to actually report to their units.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1	21	11	44	9

68. Legal considerations will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Reserve Component units for any future contingency.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
5	39	22	16	4

69. Political considerations will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Reserve Component units for any future contingency.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
3	21	7	45	10

70. Active Component CAPSTONE and Roundout headquarters have done their best to make CAPSTONE and Roundout programs work.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
4	10	33	35	3

71. The more exposure Active Component officers and NCOs have with Reserve Component units, the more value they tend to place on the Reserve Components.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
0	19	16	41	8

72. The Active Component must become more involved with training the Reserve Components.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
1	7	8	50	21

73. Acknowledging the greatly increased warning time for conventional conflict in Central Europe, all heavy maneuver combat forces beyond the contingency corps and forward deployed forces could be shifted to the Reserve Components.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
44	32	4	6	0

74. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the basis for some Army force structure should be non-combatant missions. (Nation Assistance, Disaster Response, Domestic Projects, etc.).

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
13	20	5	36	11

75. To truly implement the Total Force Policy, Reserve Component officers and NCOs should be assigned to positions in Active Component TOE units, to include command.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
17	26	16	20	6

76. To truly implement the Total Force Policy, Active Component officers and NCOs should be assigned to positions in Reserve Component TOE units, to include command.

Strongly Disagree	Generally Disagree	Neutral	Generally Agree	Strongly Agree
8	15	19	34	10

77. Compared to the Active Army, how much influence do you believe the Army National Guard has with Congress?

50 Much more than the Active Army

25 Somewhat more than the Active Army

09 About the same as the Active Army

02 Somewhat less than the Active Army

00 Much less than the Active Army

78. Compared to the Active Army, how much influence do you believe the Army Reserve has with Congress?

- 19 Much more than the Active Army
- 24 Somewhat more than the Active Army
- 25 About the same as the Active Army
- 14 Somewhat less than the Active Army
- 02 Much less than the Active Army

79. Compared to the Army National Guard, how much influence do you believe the Army Reserve has with Congress?

- 02 Much more than the Guard
- 02 Somewhat more than the Guard
- 13 About the same as the Guard
- 44 Somewhat less than the Guard
- 23 Much less than the Guard

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Use this page to elaborate on specific survey questions, or to provide any additional thoughts/comments on the subject of Reserve Components and their role in the Army. Comments based on your personal experiences with or observation of Reserve Component units during operational deployments would be particularly useful.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORTS.

PLEASE RETURN THE COMPLETED SURVEY TO LTC MIKE HARRISON, BOX131